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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL B. QUICK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940083 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Michael B. Quick relies on his opening brief and also 
refers to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, the issues, 
the case, and the facts. Appellant otherwise replies to the State's 
brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A new trial may be ordered if three requirements for newly 
discovered evidence are met. The first requirement, the 
nondiscoverable nature of the evidence, is not contested by either 
party. Both parties agree that even with reasonable diligence, 
Frank Connelly's application for workmen's compensation could not 
have been produced at trial. 
The evidence also must not be "merely cumulative." While 
the State argues that Connelly may have been impeached repeatedly 
throughout the trial, none of its cited examples relate to 
Connelly's newfound admission that he was shot while interviewing 
with some people as part of my job with Allied." The second 
requirement was fulfilled. 
Since Connelly himself acknowledged the above statement 
with his signature, the newly discovered evidence reveals 
information best left for the jury's consideration. Ordinarily, 
evidence from a neutral third party is considered to be "of a 
different kind and nature than [a] defendant's statements" because 
it lacks a self serving basis. Consequently, when the "victim" 
himself contradicts his trial testimony in a manner supportive of 
the defendant's theory, Michael Quick's defense that the shooting 
occurred in the presence of "some people" during a drug deal gone 
awry takes on much greater significance. 
Not only would the above render a different result probable 
on retrial, the evidence initially presented also lacked physical 
corroboration. Connelly claimed that he was shot repeatedly for no 
apparent reason by a man who had interviewed him. If this story was 
true, a third bullet should have been located in the front seat of 
the vehicle. It has not been recovered. The jury should have been 
able to consider Connelly's own statement that more persons were 
involved in determining whether the unprovoked shooting was tied to 




THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL 
BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, REPRESENTATIONS BY 
THE "VICTIM" WHICH CONTRADICTED HIS OWN TRIAL 
TESTIMONY AND WHICH CORROBORATED A FACT CRITICAL TO 
THE DEFENSE 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
Undisputed by both parties is the fact that the newly 
discovered evidence, Frank Connelly's application for workmen's 
compensation, could not have been produced at trial. Appellee's 
brief, page 8. Thus, the first requirement for granting a new trial 
was satisfied. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). The 
State disputes, however, the fulfillment of the two other 
requirements: the noncumulative nature of the evidence and the 
probability of a different result. Appellee's brief, pages 9-16. 
A. The Newly Discovered Application Form Was 
Independent Evidence, Noncumulative 
Statements Corroborative of Michael Quick's 
Testimony 
According to the State, Frank Connelly's application form 
"is merely cumulative of defense counsel's several attempts to 
impeach Connelly by pointing out minor arguable inconsistencies in 
his prior statements." Appellee's brief, pages 9-10. Of the five 
examples cited by the State, though, not one of them is cumulative 
of Connelly's representation that he was shot "while interviewing 
with some people as part of my job with Allied." (R 162). While 
Connelly's veracity was undoubtedly in question, none of the listed 
examples address the new information discovered in the application. 
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In fact, because the State acknowledges that "the statement 
on the application form was prepared by a third person and was not 
Connelly's direct statement[,]" Appellee's brief, page 11, the newly 
discovered evidence fits squarely under James' pronouncements: 
Evidence from a neutral third party is not merely 
cumulative of a criminal defendant's testimony. It 
is of a different kind and nature than defendant's 
statements, and it certainly could have a different 
quality in the eyes of the jurors who assess the 
credibility of the witnesses. This evidence was not 
merely cumulative, but was independent evidence 
which corroborated defendant's statements. 
James, 819 P.2d at 794-95 (footnotes omitted). 
The representations here were similarly of a different 
kind and nature. Other than Michael Quick's own testimony, no 
statements were better suited for the jury's assessment than those 
signed by, and prepared on behalf of, the "victim" himself. (R 162). 
Frank Connelly's statements were not cumulative of anything 
otherwise said or done at trial; rather, his admissions corroborated 
important aspects of Michael Quick's account. See generally Opening 
Brief of Mr. Quick, pages 14-17. 
B. A Different Result Is Probable On Retrial 
With The Inclusion Of The Newly Discovered 
Application Form 
According to the State, the claimed distinction between 
James and the case at bar is that in the former situation "evidence 
surfaced after trial that a key witness [Mr. Peterson] had 
fabricated his testimony that he heard James confess to having 
killed the boy." Appellee's brief, page 11. The James opinion 
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"found that evidence to be of a different quality than 'merely 
cumulative' or 'merely credibility' evidence, because it showed that 
the witness 'had deliberately committed perjury' on a crucial issue. 
James, 819 P.2d at 794." Appellee's brief, page 11. 
James and the present case both encompass key testimony 
on critical issues. Contrary to the State's argument, in the James' 
appeal the supreme court awarded James a new trial because the newly 
discovered evidence (Peterson's recantation) "concerned a disputed 
fact that arose between Peterson's testimony and James's, whether or 
not Peterson's testimony concerning the overheard confession was 
truthful." Id. at 794. 
In the instant action, Frank Connelly's statements also 
concerned a disputed fact (whether he was shot "while interviewing 
with some people as part of my job with Allied") that arose between 
Connelly's testimony and Michael Quick's. Of great import is that 
Connelly's statements in the application form disputed Connelly's 
own position at trial. In other words, unlike the situation in 
James where the new evidence merely addressed the claims of a third 
party, the new evidence here eviscerated the "victim's" very own 
contentions. 
The jury should have been able to consider the evidence, 
notwithstanding claims that it was prepared by a third party, Lester 
Perry. (R 162). Since Frank Connelly admittedly signed the 
application, it was up to the jury to decide how much weight to give 
to his prepared acknowledgments. 
. 5 _ 
As explained previously, the new evidence would have 
rendered a different result probable on retrial. The "some people" 
representation supported Mr. Quick's testimony concerning a third 
person in the backseat of the Explorer during the drug deal. 
(R 722-28). Frank Connelly did not act alone, nor did he just 
happen to have a gun handy in his ankle hoster to defend himself 
during a drive to the airport with a person he had wanted to impress 
and with whom he was at ease. (R 405, 458-60, 463). The physical 
evidence also raised more questions than it answered. Even assuming 
the truthfulness of Connelly's story, the evidence does not explain 
why the third bullet was not lodged in the front seat, or how such a 
shooting occurred given the manuevering of the parties. See Opening 
Brief of Michael Quick, pages 16-17. 
The State's reliance on State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290 
(Utah App. 1990), is misplaced in light of the prevailing analysis 
from James. The general rule may indeed be that "[w]hen 'new' 
evidence merely tends to impeach or discredit the testimony of a 
witness, . . . a new trial need not be grantedf,]" Becker, 803 P.2d 
at 1294, but the James opinion nevertheless carved out an exception 
for a "motion based on evidence that Peterson testified falsely." 
James, 819 P.2d at 795. Where, as here, evidence arises on a 
disputed fact and it stands independently to, and in corroboration 
of, the defendant's testimony, a new trial should be granted. 
Factually, Becker is also distinguishable. In Michael 
Quick's case, the statements by Frank Connelly in his application 
form conflicted with his own testimony at trial. By comparison, the 
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information at issue in Becker pertained to a person whose own 
statements were not the subject of contradiction and whose own 
involvement did not extend to that of a claimed victim. Becker, 803 
P.2d at 1294. 
State v. Abi-Sarkis, 535 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio App. 1988), is 
more closely aligned to Michael Quick's case. In Abi-Sarkis, the 
defendant had been charged and convicted of rape. Shortly 
thereafter, the involved victim instituted civil proceedings and 
recounted the events for a deposition. Contradictions in her 
deposition testimony, however, were ultimately used by Abi-Sarkis in 
his motion for a new criminal trial. 535 N.E.2d at 754-55. Even 
though the Ohio rule requires newly discovered evidence to be 
neither cumulative nor to "merely impeach or contradict the former 
evidence", the court of appeals nonetheless concluded that the 
deposition raised serious questions about what had actually 
transpired. The information surfacing in Abi-Sarkis and in Michael 
Quick's case both contradicted the "victims'" very own statements. 
Far more telling and revealing than a collateral witness' statement, 
Connelly's signed representations in his application for workmen's 
compensation contradicted his trial testimony and would have 




THE WOUNDS AND INJURIES CONSTITUTED UNNECESSARY AND 
CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE LIKELY TO AROUSE THE JURY'S 
SYMPATHIES AND TO SWAY THEIR VERDICT TO FIND SOMEONE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGE WHICH HAD BEEN DONE 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief)1 
In its citation to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
State sets forth protections specifically applicable to the case at 
bar: 
Rule 403 .. . provides for the exclusion of evidence 
"if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice." This occurs when the 
evidence has an "undue tendency to suggest decision on 
an improper basis fsuch as] an emotional one," or 
1. Appellant responds briefly to the cited Standard of 
Review. See Appellee's brief, page 16 (citing State v. White, 246 
Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah App. 1994), and State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1994)). While the principles announced in White are not 
entirely incorrect, the "pasture" analogy of Pena is necessary to 
put the standard of review in the appropriate context. "[I]t is our 
role as an appellate court to define what the law is, and we never 
defer to any degree to a trial court on that count." Pena, 869 P.2d 
at 937. While an admissibility decision is a guestion of law, see 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993), 
the critical guestion, and one of some subtlety, arises 
only after we have said that an issue is a guestion of 
law and no deference is owed the trial court. At this 
point, we must attempt to determine when the articulated 
legal rule to be applied to a set of facts—a rule that 
we establish without deference to the trial courts— 
embodies a de facto grant of discretion which permits the 
trial court to reach one of several possible conclusions 
about the legal effect of a particular set of facts 
without risking reversal. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 937. 
The degree of discretion is likened to a pasture and the 
amount of room given to a trial judge as s/he applies a stated legal 
principle to the facts. While the size of the pasture for the 
admission of evidence is considerable, Pena, 869 P.2d at 938, the 
standard of review for the legal issue is one of law. Id. at 937. 
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"appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense 
of horror, fori provokes its instinct to punish." 
Appellee's brief, page 17 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
Since the State in its case-in-chief did not measure or 
diagram "the probable angle of the shots", Appellee's brief, 
page 18, it argues that Connelly's graphic display of his scars "was 
probative to corroborate his account of how he was positioned when 
the shooting occurred." Appellee's brief, page 16. Pursuant to its 
own explanation on appeal, however, there was no need to corroborate 
wounds which were described verbally and less prejudicially. See 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986) (evidence which is 
merely cumulative or which can "readily be provided to the jury by 
less potentially prejudicial means" has minimal, if any, legal 
relevance). 
Contrary to the State's position, the record does indicate 
"that Connelly's wounds were disfiguring, grotesque, or otherwise 
likely to provoke an emotional response such as horror or pity." 
Appellee's brief, pages 17-18. While no pictures were used, such 
exhibits would have paled in comparison to the in-court undressing 
of Connelly and his graphic display of head, neck, and stomach 
wounds. (R 430). Instead of seeing mere photographs, the in-court 
presentation provoked sympathy beyond that which may have been 
produced by a mechanical camera. 
An emotional response inures itself into the jury's 
verdict. Even assuming the truthfulness of Frank Connelly's story, 
the third bullet should have lodged itself into the front seat of 
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the car. See Opening Brief of Mr, Quick, pages 16-17. Yet the 
jury's passions were otherwise swayed by an instinct to punish 
someone for the wounds they had just seen up close and in detail. 
One party's word had been pitted against the other. 
Displaying the wounds, though# improperly shifted the focus of 
(mis)identifying the responsible gunman to a blurred knee-jerk 
reaction that somebody had to be held responsible. Frank Connelly's 
display of his wounds to the jury was both improper and prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Michael Quick respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse his conviction and remand the case to the trial court 
for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this lb day of October, 1994. 
' tr- < T 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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